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The global financial crisis has now spread across multiple countries and sectors, affecting both 
financial and real spheres in the advanced as well as the developing economies. This has been caused 
by policies based on “rational expectation” models that advocate deregulated finance, with facilities 
for easy credit and derivatives, along with globalized exposures for financial institutions. The 
financial crisis has combined with long-term structural changes in the real economy that trend toward 
underconsumption, generating contractionary effects therein and contributing to further instabilities 
in the financial sector.  
The responses so far from US monetary authorities have not been effective, especially in 
dealing with issues of unemployment and low real growth in the United States, or in other countries. 
Nor have these been of much use in the context of the lost monetary and fiscal autonomy in both 
developing countries and the eurozone, especially with the debt-related distress in the latter. 
Solutions to the current maladies in the global economy include strict control of financial speculation 
and the institution of an “employer of last resort” policy, both at the initiative of the state. 
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The mayhem, that started in the deregulated financial markets of the US at the end of 2008, 
spilled over by early 2009 to rest of the global economy at large. Action taken so far on the 
part of policymakers, especially in the advanced regions which also happen to be the major 
victims of the recent financial crisis, have not achieved success in deterring the systemic  
crisis and its sporadic outbursts in global financial markets. The crisis did not remain 
confined to pockets of US credit and security markets, as can be witnessed by its spread to 
other countries which include the Euroland (and of late the smaller countries in Southern 
Europe) as well as developing countries. Nor did it remain confined, from the very 
beginning, to the financial sphere, thus impacting the already squeezed space of the real 
economy. Thus the shock which surfaced in the financial sector had its concurrence in the 
continuing real stagnation of these economies. As we would point out below, the disruptions 
in the financial sector as well as the underperformance in the real sector can both be related 
to the logic of the neo-liberal growth models and the policy frame emanating there-from. 
Our analysis in the present paper has been arranged as follows: Section I offers a critical 
review of the dominant logic of the “efficient market” paradigm which underlies the 
mainstream economic theory and policy to justify the deregulation of markets including the   
financial sector. Section II generates a theoretical framework which we would like to offer as 
an alternative interpretation of the deepening slump in real activities along with the bursting 
of financial bubbles as happened recently. Our analysis relies, as theoretical foundations, on 
both the Post Keynesian structuralist framework of underconsumption led stagnation as well 
as the Minskyan Financial Instability Hypothesis. Our arguments seek to provide an 
explanation of the recent turbulence in global financial markets and its long-term real 
stagnation over the last five decades. We also point at policies in advanced countries, which 
are often followed in the rest of world, as responsible for generating underconsumption as 
well as the speculative bubble in the respective economies. Section III narrates the unfolding 
of the crisis as took place in the financial markets, focusing primarily on the US where it 
started, while drawing attention to its spread to other countries including Euroland and  
developing countries. Section IV dwells upon the policy space, drawing attention to the 
limitations, especially in rich industrialized countries, of the recent moves to deter the 
financial crisis. Section V offers concluding observations and an alternative plan which 
chalks out actions which we expect to be more effective, not only to contain the financial 
crisis, but also to regenerate real activities that can instill growth with distributional justice 




I.  FOR DEREGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ITS CRITIQUE 
By postulating full information (relating to the present and future), along with rationality for 
all agents in the capital market (who are supposed to have free access to such information),  
mainstream literature dealing with market decisions dispenses, by assumption, the notion of 
uncertainty. Formulations as above are identified in the literature as an “efficient market” 
paradigm, with the claim that a set of “rational” expectations can be made regarding all 
outcomes in the future, relating to decisions which are made today. Reliance is placed in 
these theories, while framing expectations on what is viewed as probability of future events. 
However, since a large enough sample to calculate the probability distribution is not easy to 
obtain, theories use the record of past events as a proxy to guide the probability of future 
events. As held by critics, this amounts to an “ergodic axiom” which allows the agents to 
“presume that the future is merely the statistical shadow of the past”
1. With uncertainty 
having no role to play in the market for capital, speculation is naturally reduced to arbitrage 
even in inter-temporal space; and liberalization of finance to achieve optimal allocation of 
resources follows as a policy conclusion.
2  
Formulations in mainstream doctrines on financial markets include the portfolio (asset 
market) approach which postulate an “efficient market” equilibrium in allocating capital. 
Agents operating in the capital market are assumed to have full information relating to the 
expected changes in variables, thus ruling out uncertain prospects (Davidson 1978, pp. 11-
13).
 
Variants of the optimal portfolio models recognize the role of trading and information 
costs at equilibrium. However, it is also held that prices have a tendency to quickly adjust to 
such information which is never in private domain. It can thus be held that the system tends 
to set “conventions” consistent with “fundamentals,” with the process similar to what has 
been described as a “random walk along Wall Street” (Fama 1991, pp. 1575-617, and 2001.). 
In a different approach which is identified as New Keynesian Economics (NKE), 
short period disequilibrium in markets is explained by incomplete (or asymmetric) 
information. It is held that asymmetric information in the credit market limits the capacity of 
the lenders to separate out the “good” ones amongst the borrowers from those which are the 
“bad” (or defaulting types). In this the borrowers are assumed to have better knowledge as 
compared to lenders in terms of their own inclinations for default. They are also assumed to 
                                                              
1   For details see Paul Davidson 2009. 




have the capacity to choose, and often prefer the high-risk high-return projects, which goes 
with an ability to exit by default (Sachs 2001, pp. 197-243; Cooper and Sachs 1985, pp. 21-
60).  For the above reasons, the lenders can resort to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981, pp. 393-410), which excludes a section of borrowers from the market.  
As pointed out by critics, on scrutiny these models around asymmetric information 
seem to rely on rational agents in the credit markets, both as borrowers and lenders. In the 
absence of the former, the equilibrium reached would thus correspond to the Pareto optima. 
In this regard it has been pointed out that even regulations like a Tobin tax on currency 
speculation, which aims to curb noise traders in the market, when effective, are expected to 
reach equilibrium which will be Pareto optimal (Davidson 1999, pp. 91-91). 
Critics of the “efficient market” hypothesis have pointed at its limitations, both on 
logical grounds and on grounds of the failure of these theories to relate to reality. It is 
observed that shortcomings, as above, are mostly due to an inadequate handling of 
uncertainty in these formulations. Questioning, in particular,  the legitimacy of the portfolio 
(or asset market) approach and the efficient market equilibrium,  critics in the Keynesian 
tradition point at the difficulties of calculating the probability of these risks with actuarial 
precision, especially under uncertainty. Interpretations, as above, are consistent with 
Keynes’s position on probability in the General Theory (1936) and later, in his Economic 
Journal (1937) article. The notion of “animal spirits” is further clarified by Keynes as 
follows: “. . . By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain I do not mean merely to distinguish 
what is known from what is probable....About these matters, there is no scientific basis on 
which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know” (Keynes 1973, 
p. 114 [1937]).
  
Dwelling further on related positions, it can be suggested that knowledge (and its 
absence which is uncertainty) tend to be subjective. Hence it can never rely exclusively on 
past events and thus be ergodic. Also knowledge (or uncertainty) is not a natural phenomenon 
which is time invariant. It is ontological and is embedded in social reality which, as Shackle 
described it, is “kaleidoscopic” and also one which relates to what Joan Robinson labeled as 
“historic time” (Shackle 1974).  
   As for the implications of the policies advocated in the mainstream literature, it is not 
difficult to see that it is the combination of uncertainty and easy access to credit which can be 
held responsible for financial crises under deregulation. By making possible the short-run 
entry and volatile exit of players in the financial market, financial liberalization makes for 




real assets in the long run. Instead the demand for financial assets are guided by prospects of 
“quasi-rents” as determined by profits and losses in the short run (Davidson 1999, pp. 91-92). 
With availability of credit and information technology which make for fast communications, 
perceptions are also prone to quick revisions. This explains the bandwagon effects often 
observed in the financial markets.
3  
Reflecting further on what we have mentioned  above, it can be held that knowledge 
(and its opposite, uncertainty) can improve if institutions like contracts and conventions 
remain “stable”; a situation warranting policies of effective intervention and stabilization on 
the part of the regulatory authorities (Dequech 1995; Terzi 1999; Lawson 1988). It is 
sometimes argued that uncertainty is “gradable” and that it is a subjective notion which is 
based in part on “epistemic” theories of probability and otherwise on properties of real world 
(ibid). This view is based on the notion that both uncertainty and knowledge are “gradable.” 
To quote, “. . . if uncertainty is gradable, government action may reduce it and thereby 
increase confidence” (Dequech 1995). The above is particularly relevant in a money 
economy where it matters to “… protect the sanctity of money contracts …(and) the essence 
of the entrepreneurial system we call capitalism” (Davidson 2009). As it has been held, there 
exists a role in the above context for the “market makers,” to provide an assurance to those 
who hold financial assets “…that the market price of their holdings will always change in an 
orderly manner” (ibid). The need thus arises for a “credible market maker” to provide an 
anchor to “market psychology.” One can distinguish between private and public agencies, 
say, the former with expert advice from Merril Lynch or similar private bodies which finally 
failed to fulfill their promises to investors during the recent global crisis in US (ibid). 
In a paper relating to investment decisions in Keynesian theory, (Anderson and Goldsmith 
1997) the authors stressed the role of the weight attached to expectations in these decisions. 
The approach, as argued, is consistent with what Keynes visualized as “expectations of future 
profitability” and the “confidence with which we forecast the future.” Thus investment is 
driven by the expectations of future profits on the part of the decision-making business 
manager and also by the confidence assigned to them on the basis of these forecasts based on 
expectations. Their approach, as claimed, “…can be viewed more broadly as a test of those 
theories that suggest that expectations matter in the determination of investment.” The 
                                                              
3 Connected with the above sequences is the social construction of credit, which speaks for the social exclusion 
of borrowers relatively weak in terms of their ability to enter the credit market. These borrowers however, have 
a great deal of potential in a recession-prone economy due to their higher consumption propensities See for an 
elaboration  of  the  argument,  Gary  Dymski,  ‘The  Social  Construction  of  Creditworthiness:  Asymmetric 




authors provided an empirical test of their hypothesis to explain investment in a market 
economy (ibid). 
 
The model specified in the paper goes as follows:  
 
I = f(BEF, weight)  
where I:investment; 
BEF: business executive forecast and weight, or confidence associated with that forecast.  
 
The above  can also be expressed as  
I = f(BEF, MISS)  
 
where MISS: forecast inaccuracy which is the inverse of weight  such that MISS = 1/weight 
(ibid, pp. 67-68). 
  
Testing the model on the basis of sample data, the authors arrive at the conclusion that 
“. . . whether ill-informed or not, whether rational or not, whether stable or not, they 
(managers with their subjective perceptions) are of fundamental importance in the deter-
mination of investment, and hence, macroeconomic stability” (italics added) (ibid, p. 72). 
 One can here interpret the low weight (or the high MISS observed by the manager) as 
“paucity of evidence” in terms of probability. Thus uncertainty implies situations where 
knowledge is incomplete and not totally reliable. This is also consistent with the theoretical 
position subscribed by the authors that “. . . uncertainty is not total ignorance” (Dequech 
1997). One can here dwell again, on the influence the “market maker” can have on the 
“weight” associated with forecasts of business managers, as in the model mentioned above. 
 
II. ON INTERPRETING THE CRISIS: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINT  
To provide a well-rounded view of the recent crisis in the global economy one can here 
mention the short-term factors which relate to the flare-up of the financial crisis  (with its 
spillover to the real sector in recent times) and distinguish those from forces of a longer 
duration. The latter relates to the structural changes in the pattern of growth and distribution 
as have taken place in the global economy. In our judgment those structural changes can also 




We would first dwell on the pattern of structural changes which can also be held 
responsible for the recent mayhem in financial markets, to be detailed later in this paper. In 
providing our analysis we have made use of supportive arguments in recent studies which use 
the underconsumption thesis to explain the recent crisis (Cripps, Izurieta, and Singh 2010; 
Boyer 2000 and 2010; and Patnaik 2010). 
 A symmetric change in wages and labor productivity marked the beginning of the 
post-Second War period when both were rising with production subject to Fordist expansions 
over the next three decades. Successive changes which affected the international economy 
over these years included the oil price hikes causing inflationary potentials and current 
account imbalances in the advanced economies. These developments initiated a regime 
change in economic policies with monetarism superseding the earlier policies which made for 
a Keynesian welfare state. With deregulation of markets, a logical corollary to the shift in 
policies, a systematic pattern came up where expansions in financial activities were no longer 
backed by proportionate growth rates in the real economy. The above contrasted the pattern 
in the earlier years, often described as the “Golden Age of Capitalism.” The tardy growth in 
employment and wage rates in the advanced countries could be attributed to the flexible labor 
policy which was a component of the on-going liberal economic policies. With deregulated 
finance providing high returns on financial assets in the market, investments in the real sector 
sounded much less attractive. Also the competitive pressures, as a consequence of the 
globalization of markets generated further compressions of labor costs in the flexible labor 
market. Competitive pressures also led to an upgrading of technology with rising capital-
labor ratios which considerably reduced the wage share in aggregate output. 
Structural transformations, as above, have been responsible for a chronic under-
consumption tendency, not only in advanced countries but also in the developing area. As for 
the advanced countries, goods produced at home faced demand shortfalls within the country. 
This was both, with a lack of competitiveness vis à vis cheaper imports and a drop in 
domestic demand, caused by the ongoing wage squeeze as well as unemployment. This 
created a situation which can also be identified as one of a “realization crisis” at home. 
However, the tendency for underconsumption did not surface in the aggregate as long as   
liberal credit in the deregulated financial markets continued to provide facilities for leverages, 
largely to take advantage of capital gains in the overpriced property and stock markets. This 
resulted in tendencies toward “over-borrowing” by the private sector which was reflected in 
the continuing deficits in the current account balance, especially of United States.  The excess 




additional import demand from the developing world because much of those financial flows 
were recycled within the financial sector. 
As for the financial boom under deregulated finance, the pace of financialization of 
assets was triggered by rising expectations of future value as well as returns on assets held 
with the financial sector. One can observe the connection between investment and finance, 
changes which are subject the state of expectations under uncertainty. We refer to the initial 
formulation of the above link in Keynes’s General Theory (1936), where liquidity preference 
has been related to asset prices and new investments.
4 Thus uncertainty and the state of 
expectations are expected to shape the level of confidence relating to movements in yield as 
well as asset prices and also the need for liquidity held as a contingency. A rise in the level of 
confidence, held by all who operate in the asset market, is expected to contribute to 
expectations of higher yields as well as a rise in future prices of assets which reduce the need 
for contingent reserves of liquidity.
5 There exists, therefore, a clear connection between 
investment and the need for finance as a contingent, with the two moving in opposite 
direction under uncertainty. 
Analyzing the pattern of changes in the financial institutions of the advanced 
countries over the last two decades, the unprecedented boom, in our view, was a major force 
driving the crisis, while a considerable part of these sequences ( as described in section III 
below), can be explained by relying on Minsky’s characterization of  deregulated financial 
markets and the “unstable economy.” Considering the new-fangled sources of credit, 
especially, with the involvement of banks in the security market under universal banking, 
Minsky drew attention to the fact that in the new institutional setting, banks and non-bank 
financial entities can follow an “originate and distribute” model which involve a re-packaging 
of assets  and their sales. In this the shifting of risks to counterparties generates more profits 
                                                              
4 As formulated by Keynes, net returns on individual assets (including money) are determined by the expected 
yield in physical terms (q), carrying costs (c), the liquidity cost (l)  (for holding the asset) and expected changes 
if any, in the price of the asset (a). One thus arrives at a notion of the “own rate of interest”, on assets including 
money and measured in terms of itself (as q-c+l+a).The “own rate” also reflects the marginal efficiency of 
capital for each such asset. As Keynes viewed it, to continue with the purchase of individual assets (new 
investments), the respective own rate of interest (marginal efficiency as defined above) has to be higher than 
those on other assets including money. However, for assets other than money the own rates of interest are likely 
to fall with additional investments, especially due to a drop in yield (both actual and expected). But such 
declines are absent for money (which, as held by Keynes, has no intrinsic yield, carrying cost, or price 
appreciation during the short period). Thus a point will come when the own rate of interest on money will be 
equalized to those on other assets, indicating an equilibrium situation where the returns on all assets including 
money are equalized (Keynes 1951, pp225-229). 




than is possible from the simple “commitment models” which rely on the rate spread at the 
loan officer’s desk.
6 These practices, according to Minsky, made for higher profitability with 
market-based funding, as compared to bank-based funding of projects. In the process banks 
got involved in the security market. Thus there is, as held by Minsky, a “symbiotic relation” 
between the universalized financial structures (which contrasts the earlier pattern of 
segregated banking) and the related securitization of financial instruments (Minsky 2008). 
Pointing at the role of securitization and the use of security-based assets, the above 
version draws attention to the changing character of money as had already taken place by the 
late sixties, especially with credit flows no longer constrained, by the value of reserves and 
capital held by banks as had been the case under a fractional reserve system. Thus 
“...securitization implies that there is no limit to bank initiative in creating credits for there is 
no recourse to bank capital and because the credits do not absorb high powered money (bank 
reserves) (ibid). This also considerably lowers the weight of central banks to protect credit, as 
evident in the recent financial crisis. Efforts on part of monetary authorities (following 
monetarist norms) to raise interest rates in order to control inflation may even lead to a 
collapse of stock prices and hence to a financial crisis rather than to a state of financial 
stability (ibid). 
         It has been pointed out that the range of assets in the portfolio choice by the investor 
can be spaced between liquid (cash and short-term financial assets) and physical assets 
(which include real estate). Given the above asset structure, the investor may prefer to move 
away from long-term to short-run financial assets which are relatively liquid when 
uncertainty extorts a heavy toll on discounting the future. Similar to Keynes’s liquidity trap, 
such situations characterize the tendencies of “short-termism” in a money/credit economy. 
Assets here, however, are not subject to a binary classification (of money/bonds) as in 
Keynes, but have a range with varying degrees of liquidity along a whole spectrum (Hicks 
1974).  
According to some, the “financial excess” as above was a major driver of the neo-
liberal growth models which relied on borrowing along with asset-price inflation, both 
facilitated by financial deregulation (Palley 2010). Thus the financial boom played a critical 
role in the advanced economies by providing sources of demand which came from outside the 
real sector. However, the system was essentially an unstable one, as witnessed by the collapse 
of the economy which started with the disrupted financial sector in 2008. 
                                                              




As for the developing countries, inadequate domestic demand (with a shortfall of 
purchasing power, especially of the wage earners) often led these countries to follow export-
oriented strategies, which require further disciplining of labor in a bid to save on labor costs. 
The shortfall in domestic demand could hardly be compensated by rising exports to advanced 
countries which, as explained above, were also subject to low growth rates. Not much space 
is thus left for expansion in the real sphere in either the advanced or the developed nations, 
for reasons which are not too different from each other.  On the whole, the world economy 
has been subject to a lop-sided pattern of expansions, with growth in the real sector falling far 
behind the unprecedented growth of the financial sector, which was subject to sporadic as 
well as unprecedented gyrations in the recent past. 
The alternative perspective on the melt-down of the global economy provided above 
contests the notion of an “efficient market” postulated by the mainstream school.  Drawing 
attention to the underconsumptionist tendencies of product markets in advanced countries, 
which are tagged by export-drives in the developing world, our analysis highlights the 
repression of labor in these liberalized regimes which rely on labor flexibility. The shortfall 
in demand, while partially compensated by the brisk churning of asset-backed securities, 
failed to sail through when financial markets in advanced economies virtually collapsed by 
late 1980. A major reason for the latter was the erosion of confidence in those transactions, an 
aspect which mainstream theory and policy never recognized. The alternative position we 
offer looks at the uncertainty-ridden trail of markets, which often deviates from the 
predictions of the private “market makers.” A position, as above, has considerable 
significance for policies that are appropriate to mend the system.  
 
III THE MELT-DOWN OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE REAL ECONOMY  
The crumbling down of financial markets which started in late 2008 has been instrumental in 
generating varieties of arguments on the causes of the crisis and large numbers of remedies as 
are considered appropriate. While views differ, especially in identifying the specific factors 
that might have led to the crisis, it is now well accepted, even in circles subscribing to 
mainstream economic policies, that the theme of growth under the “efficient market” 
paradigm has failed to deliver what it initially had promised. We dwell, in this section, on the 
sequence and intensity of the crisis in the real and financial sectors of the advanced 




As for the advanced economies, despite the rather poor record of their real activities 
experienced over the last three decades, they witnessed marked expansions in their financial 
dealings until the onset of the financial crisis in late 2008. The latter pulled down the output 
and employment growth rates which were already low in those economies, thus putting both 
financial and the real sectors in serious disarray. Growth rates of GDP in the US, which were 
hovering around 2 percentage points on an average between 1998 and 2007, dropped sharply, 
to 0.3, (-)3.6, and 2.9 percentage points respectively during 2008, 2009, and 2010. For the 
Euro, declines were similar, from an average of 3.0 percent during 1998-2007 to 0.0, (-)2.6, 
and 2.9 percentages for 2008, 2009, and 2010. Japan also recorded similar declines, from 1.2 
percent during 1998-2007 to (-)1.2, (-)6.3, and 4.0 percentages during 2008, 2009, and 2010.
7 
The unemployment rate, even by official statistics (which is often an underestimate) showed 
an average of 8.3 percent for OECD as a whole by May 2009, and recording higher rates in 
individual countries like Spain (18.9 percent), Portugal (10 percent), Ireland (12.2 percent), 
and US ( 9.4 percent).
 8 According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, the US 
unemployment rate edged up from 8.8% to 9.0 % over April 2010, with respective rates for 
Blacks and Hispanics at 16.1% and 11.6%
9.
 There has not been any significant degree of 
reduction in unemployment rates and/or a rise in output growth rates in OECD countries 
between 2009 and 2010. As we will point out later, a comprehensive policy package under 
the head of ARRA was introduced by the US President in February 2009 to combat 
unemployment.  
   Dwelling on the great turbulence in global financial markets, its origin can be traced 
back to the crisis in the sub-prime loan market of the US. A boom in the latter over the last 
few years ended up in a crash by the autumn of 2008.  Even before that, the booming 
financial market in the US had been spurring transactions in derivative markets. The latter 
included the Asset Backed Securities (ABS)  and the Credit Default Swaps (CDS). Those got 
a boost as the booming property market in US opened up newer profit opportunities on the 
mortgaging of houses, which turned out as both easy and lucrative. While the housing market 
was targeting US citizens so-far excluded by banks from the financial markets on grounds of 
race and/or income, (as well as on grounds of the risk-weighted credit-rationing) (Dymski 
2008), it became an opportune moment for banks and non-bank intermediaries to venture out 
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8 http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/unemployment-rate_20752342-table1 




to these new markets with easy sources of credit for leveraging. Possibilities to securitize the 
mortgaged assets threw open new channels of investments, for the mortgage-brokerage firms, 
the issuers and insurers of ABSs, for investment bankers, as well as for other financial 
institutions which readily purchased and repackaged those securities. Each, by acquiring an 
asset, were able to leverage by obtaining credit against the same, which in turn was no longer 
subject to monetary control by the Fed. In the event, a large number of US firms were able to 
access short-term credit by making use of securitized assets as collateral which were even 
treated in the market as commercial papers (Wray 2008). Transactions as above facilitated the 
churning of those ABSs, generated on the basis of the underlying (or the original) asset, while 
propping up multiple counterparties which held those assets. Credit flows as above (along 
non-banking channels of the derivative markets, described as “shadow banking”) (Nersisyan 
and Wray 2011) were not only  unrestrained, but also offered at rates  which had much lower 
spreads as compared to those  usual along conventional banking channels. The wave of 
securitization spread to financial markets in other parts of the advanced region and to 
developing countries which were all following a globalized financial structure. It also 
resulted in a massive increase in the use of derivatives. 
In the deregulated financial markets, the changing pattern of the financial transactions 
have been generating myriads of derivative instruments (like futures, swaps, options and so 
on), which aim to protect asset values in uncertain markets. Financial instruments, as above, 
have made it possible to invest in and to acquire assets far more easily, as compared to what 
it could be otherwise. Financialization did open up, since the 1980s, vast potentials for an 
explosion in the financial markets of advanced nations which included the US. These 
transactions were no more constrained by the availability of bank credit. Nor were these 
subject to the regulations and the surveillance of the Central Bank like the Federal Reserve in 
US.  
Transactions as above in the financial sector could be sustained as long as the 
instruments used for hedging worked to minimize and compensate for the risks under 
uncertainty. Risk-adjusted returns/losses on assets with  long (buy) positions (of assets) had 
to be more than covered by the losses/returns on short(sell) positions on assets.
10 An 
outcome, as above, failed to materialize in a typical “ponzi” situation which we will define in 
the following pages. It can be observed that a ponzi situation came up during the recent 
                                                              
10 As pointed out in a recent study, “Financialization is the concept that marries Minsky’s ideas about financial instability with new Marxist 
and structural Keynesian ideas about demand shortage arising from the impact of neoliberal economic policy on wages and income 




financial crisis which rendered the on-going financial transactions insolvent since leveraging 
to service past debt was no longer made possible by accessing fresh credit.  
Dwelling further on developments which of late had been instrumental in pushing the 
deregulated financial markets to a state of virtual collapse,
11 the easy access to credit 
provided the finance needed, initially for hedging when  the realized and expected income 
flows, under favorable circumstances, were  adequate to cover ( and hedge) the mandated 
payments liabilities on interest and repayments. However, hedging often ended up in 
speculation when such income flows fell short of the payment liabilities and attempts were 
made to “roll over” past debt, thus making what has been described as “balance sheet flows.” 
Finally a state arose when payment liabilities could only be met by additional borrowings. 
This is a typical case of “portfolio flows” with speculation leading to a state of ponzi finance 
which ushers in fragility and a potential collapse of the system (Minsky 1986, p. 203).  
With ponzi finance the high returns the borrowers promise to pay the lenders in order 
to entice new loans, are not necessarily realized when these funds are invested. To avoid an 
impending default and an interruption of business, the need arises, on the part of borrowers, 
to speculate and roll-over the debt related liabilities on previous investments. However, with 
the declining state of confidence in the value of financial assets held by lenders, such dealings 
in the market come to a grinding halt, leading to big holes in the balance sheets of the 
concerned parties and heralding the onset of a typical ponzi crisis. The high stakes prevailing 
in the financial markets under uncertainty may thus turn out to be disproportionately high 
compared to what eventually turns out as their realized returns. Transactions, as above, are 
both unsustainable and hazardous compared to acts of simple hedging (or even speculation) 
on asset prices in these financial markets. 
   Ponzi finance is very different from hedge or even speculatory finance, which to some 
extent keeps business going. Speculatory finance, which dwells on more risk than hedging, 
can be sustained until it becomes ponzi, when borrowing at high rates no longer generates 
compensating returns. This situation, as we point out below, did clearly plague the US 
financial markets in the fall of 2008. 
It may be relevant at this point to highlight that ponzi finance is another name for 
fraudulent behavior on the part of financial agents, as can be seen in the various scams and 
related acts in recent times.
12 
                                                              
11 See  Nesvetailova 2008 for a lucid analysis of the Ponzi constitution of  today’s financial system. 




To follow the sequence that led to the recent sub-prime crisis in the US we provide 
below a rough sketch of the possible links in the system: 
 
  To look at the statistics relating to derivatives, the gross market value of outstanding 
OTC derivatives steadily shot up, from $9.79 trillion at end of December 2005 to $35.28 
trillion by December 2008. The latter, incidentally, was more than 60 percent of world GDP 
in 2009. This was followed by a temporary dip during 2009 when these reached $21.54 
trillion, with a reversal in 2010 with the value of outstanding OTC derivatives climbing up 
again, to $24.67 trillion by June 2010.
13 
  As mentioned above, the creation of the debt financed assets through leveraging 
(often to finance derivatives) could continue only as long as there was trust and confidence in 
these newly created financial assets in the uncertain financial markets. This was evident in 
the temporary drop of the outstanding gross market value of derivatives, as mentioned above, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 




during 2009. As for the flow of private finance via the security sector, aggregate flow of 
equities across nations dwindled over 2008-2010 since the crisis started, recording a 
significant drop from the previous three years between 2005 and 2007. Similar declines were 
visible with debt finance, and especially from private sources. Thus, trading in derivatives 
continued to dominate the financial market, even when transactions in the aggregate had 
tapered off. 
  As mentioned earlier, the boom in the market for financial assets eventually gave way 
to a lull in the US. The financial crisis was prompted by a slump in the over-priced property 
market. These developments made it difficult to continue riding on the expanding mortgage 
market. Repackaging of these mortgage-based assets (which changed hands to generate 
further assets and credit opportunities) finally proved to be an Achille’s heel by impairing the 
credentials of the entire financial system in the US. Use of futures and other derivatives 
(swaps, options, etc.) expanded the scale of operations by making it possible to bid on 
positions in the security market with small margins of the final transaction in cash until full 
payment was due when the contract matured.  
  The crisis of confidence which started in the sub-prime loan markets  of the US  
spread to the real as well as the financial sectors of all advanced nations, which were sharing 
the inter-linked  financial institutions and trade across the region. The drop in financial flows 
via securities and loans, were matched by similar cuts in the flow of trade. Thus the average 
value of exports and imports of the advanced regions during 2008-10 fell sharply as 
compared to the respective values for 2005-07.  
   The financial crisis pulled down the already low output and employment growth rates  
in the advanced economies, thus rendering in a serious disarray both their financial and the 
real sectors. It may be pointed out that despite the massive financial bail-out in the US there 
has not been any significant reduction in unemployment rates nor a rise in output growth rate 
since 2009. While the contagion spread to the major European countries financial institutions, 
which had high exposures to those in the US, real activities were also hard hit in these 
countries with the dampening of trade flows across the region. 
   Of late the spread of the crisis to Euroland has taken a form which is different but no 
less severe. Some EU members in Southern Europe are experiencing a similar crisis, which is 
of serious proportions. In particular, financial institutions in Greece and Ireland have been 
affected very badly, which has damaged the credit-worthiness of those nations in the 
international credit market. A large part of these developments were related to the 




confined to the financial sector alone, a fact which was apparent with the sharp contractions 
in real activities since 2008.  
  The financial crisis which erupted in Greece and Ireland, while sharing a pattern 
which was similar, seems to be different if one traces back the nature of the problems. With 
Greece it has been a typical case of insolvency caused by public borrowings, which was made 
possible with Greece’s entry to the EU in 2002, helping the country to sell public bonds 
floated by the monetary authorities in the deregulated capital market. This was especially true 
with interest rates hovering within a low range consistent with the rates fixed elsewhere 
within the EU. Public debt of Greece started rising since the country had resorted to the 
"Restoration of Democracy Act" in 1979, which directed expenditures to the public sector. In 
the meantime Greece’s GDP was growing reasonably well at 4.2% between 2000 and 2007. 
Between 2007 and 2009 the government was run by a conservative party led by Costas 
Karamanlis, replacing the pro-socialist government led by George Papandreou, who was re-
elected by 2009.   
  The large debt and the rising fiscal deficit which Greece incurred since the early years 
of 2000 deviated from the Maastrich Treaty of the EU which stipulated the respective upper 
limits of debt to GDP ratio and the budget deficit at 60% and 3%. To remain in business, 
especially in international capital markets, attempts had been made by the Greek government 
to camouflage official figures. As disclosed later by official and other sources, attempts had 
been made to downplay the actual figures, with borrowings backed by trading in currency 
(treated as  swaps ) and with upfront cash payments  by investors , the latter against future 
trading of expected revenues from sources like  highways, airports, etc. Deals to conceal 
actual figures were often attributed to policies followed by the short-lived, right-wing 
government during 2007-09. Currently, the Federal Reserve Bank in the US has been 
engaged in an investigation of these deals, implicating Goldman Sachs for manipulating the 
transactions involving the use of derivative instruments. 
  The rising deficits and debt ratios relating to Greece have become a cause of concern 
for the global financial community, especially when made public. By December 2009, the 
country's international credit ratings were downgraded, in quick succession, by Fitch and by 
Standard and Poor's, rendering Greek bonds a junk status. The spread between the respective 
returns on Greek bonds and German bunds were more than 4% in the market. With private 
sources of credit beyond access, Greece could avoid a possible default of past loans only by 
seeking official loans which were finally sanctioned by the ECB, the EU and the IMF, with 




passage of an Economy Protection Bill which initiated a series of contractionary fiscal 
measures. The latter took its toll on GDP growth and employment, both of which have fallen 
during subsequent years. While the number of officially unemployed rose to 10.6% (and 
27.5% for young people), GDP growth was reduced to 0.7% by 2010. Developments also 
included severe cuts on social sector expenditure which were met with rising protests within 
the country.  
  Ireland of late has been facing a situation which is similar to Greece’s experience in 
terms of a near   insolvency in world’s capital markets. Unlike Greece, Ireland’s debt 
problem lies with private borrowings accumulated by the actions of the Anglo-Irish bank, a 
major financial institution. With GDP growth faltering around (-)7.06%, unemployment rates 
in Ireland were hovering around 11.8%  and public debt (which was privately incurred) was 
at around 64.8% in 2009
14. Ireland was clearly in a tight corner, especially since it sought 
fresh credit to meet the debt charges. Domestically, the taxpayers had already paid heavily at 
a swooping € 84 billion (or 56 percent of gross domestic product) for the bailout of banks, 
while the government had applied, by end of November, to international agencies for a 
bailout amounting to €85 billion
15. The Anglo-Irish bank which was the major scene of 
trouble has since been closed down by the regulators. In the meantime Greece's credit rating 
was slashed by Standard & Poor's on the 13
th of June by three notches which makes it the 
world's lowest. Later the agency said a likely debt restructuring would be considered a 
default
16.  
  Financial crises in Ireland or Greece do not represent isolated cases and can be 
followed by similar episodes in several other countries within the EU in coming years. As 
pointed out by Herman Van Rompuy, president of the EU, the situation is a "survival crisis," 
with the risk of contagion spreading from Ireland across the continent.
17 This also explains 
the concerted move of the 27 member EU to budget a €750bn fund for bailing out member 
                                                              
14 Central Intelligence Agency, USA World FactBook.  
15 “Regulators have ordered that Anglo Irish Bank be closed. Many in Ireland blame the bank for precipitating the country’s current crisis.”  
Liz Alderman  New York Times December 10 
16 http://www.cnbc.com/id/43381710/Greece_s_Debt_Rating_Slashed_Making_It_World’s _Lowest Published: Monday, 13 Jun 2011 
 








IV. RESPONDING TO CRISES: HOW HAS IT WORKED?  
   In response to the sub-prime crisis and the successive bankruptcies of major financial 
institutions,  the US Fed and  the European Central Bank sought to inject liquidity in the 
respective countries, largely in a bid to avoid a credit squeeze. An initial move, often 
mentioned as Quantitative Easing I was launched in October 2008 by George Bush. It aimed 
to buy assets from financial institutions by committing $700bn under the Troubled Assets 
Recovery Programme (TARP). Of the sum committed, $382bn was spent. Later, monetary 
authorities in the US tried to bail out several financial institutions, especially when a failure 
to act led to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a major investment bank. The cumulative 
sum deployed to rescue the ailing financial system included about $11 trillion as committed 
funds by 2011. The rescue package for the giant insurance company AIG alone amounted to 
$182 bn as committed and $127bn as invested funds. Other categories of rescue packages 
included programs designed to revive the housing market and to prevent foreclosures by 
earmarking $745bn (committed) and $130bn (actual investment) funds.
19  
  Responses to mitigate the financial crisis also included a series of regulatory 
proposals which were introduced in June 2009. These addressed, among others, consumer 
protection, executive pay, financial cushions or capital requirements for banks, expanded 
regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced authority for the 
Federal Reserve to safely wind down systemically important institutions. In January 2010, 
President Obama proposed additional regulations limiting the ability of banks to engage in 
making speculative investments that do not benefit their customers.  Supporting the move, 
Paul Volcker had argued that such speculative activity played a key role in the financial crisis 
of 2007–2010. 
20 The measure, introduced as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer protection Act
21 sought to limit bank activity in speculation, especially in the 
                                                              
18 “Europe set to bail out Ireland as debt crisis grows” by Carmel Crimmins and Luke Baker, Reuters, Nov 27, 2010   
 
19 CNN Money.com's bailout tracker at www.CNN.com 
20 ibid 




context of the security market and also in terms of bailing out corporations, often considered 
"too large to fail." 
  While the earlier bail outs and recent regulatory measures in the US, to provide 
consumer protection in the financial sector, somewhat worked to directly address what these 
measures were targeted for, the real sector continues to be in disarray. As pointed out by 
critics, the regulators, while framing the Act, completely ignored the message from Minsky’s 
work in terms of the need to shift production from capital-intensive areas to investment in 
job-creation. The latter, as pointed out by Minsky, was capable of ensuring both stability and 
an equitable income distribution (Levy Economics Institute 2100). It may be mentioned here 
that for Minsky the state should operate as "the permanent employer of last resort" (Minsky 
1986, pp. 308-13).   
  On February 10
th, 2009, a package of spending along with tax cuts known as the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was introduced in the US by its 
president. The ARRA was expected to create or save approximately 3.5 million jobs by the 
end of 2010. The transfers and tax cuts included in the legislation were expected to provide 
relief to low income and vulnerable households, which included those especially hurt by the 
economic crisis. Also the measure was supposed to support aggregate demand. It has been 
pointed out that the stimulus required per new job created could be much higher for tax cuts 
than outlays under all scenarios. This is because, first, consumption spending was constrained 
by the large outstanding household debt and also, a part of additional consumption could be 
absorbed by cheaper imports from abroad (Council on Foreign Relations 2010).  
  As pointed out above, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, unemployment 
in the US rose from 8.8% to 9.0 % in April 2010, with respective rates for Blacks and 
Hispanics at 16.1% and 11.6%. After some early signs of recovery in the fall of 2009 and the 
spring of 2010, economic growth has slowed down. With jobs generated by the private sector 
negligible, unemployment in the US is stuck near 10 percent.  Counting the number of 
unemployed who were outside the organized sector, the picture has been even worse.  
  Of late the monetary authorities in the US have been trying to revamp the economy by 
directly injecting money via quantitative easing, as done earlier in 2008-09 in terms of TARP. 
Known as QE II, the measure intends to inject $600bn of liquidity in the market by buying 
back Treasury Securities. The goal is to let banks have the excess liquidity which will lower 
interest rates by adding on to bank reserves. The above has coincided with a shift in policies 





as a result of the recent election in the House of Representatives, with Republicans favoring 
monetary policy over fiscal deficits as tools of expansionary strategy.  A similar policy-shift 
seems to be underway in Europe with moves for tax hikes and expenditure cuts 
(Papadimitriou, Hannsgen, and Zezza 2011).  Increases in liquidity and the consequent drop 
in interest rates may not, however, achieve much expansion in real activities, with the 
insensitivity of investments to cuts in rates, which is common in situations of stagnant 
demand. The overhang of debt held by households after the mortgage crisis and the record 
number of bankruptcies in the US at 1.4mn in 2009-10
22 bear testimony to the limits of 
measures like QE in generating consumption expenditure. However, the effectiveness of QE 
II in generating domestic demand may also be subject to other limitations including potential 
leakages via imports and capital flights to other destinations. Incidentally, QE II in the US 
has provoked reactions from nations facing excess inflows of capital. These countries are 
often driven to respond by adjusting their exchange rates and/or monetary policy in a manner 
which is not, strictly speaking, in national interest. Critics have labeled the phenomenon an 
"impossible trilemma," which is commonly observed in emerging economies like China and 
India. 
  On the whole efforts on the part of monetary authorities in advanced countries to 
rejuvenate their respective ailing economies have generated rather limited results. While 
helping to thwart further downslides in the financial sector in terms of bankruptcies and 
closures of financial institutions, the measures have not remedied the structural weaknesses 
of the system as are related to tendencies for short-termism and speculation in financial 
markets. No amount of financial injection can bring the system back to a stable and 
sustainable order of functioning which is free of potential shocks unless these caveats are 
addressed squarely. Similarly, policy measures like ARRA in the US may not address the 
squeeze in the consumption of households as related to their outstanding debt burden. The 
large injection via QE may lead to capital outflows in response to the higher interest rates 
abroad, and more so, when domestic rates in the US fall as a consequence of the credit 
injection.  
  The recovery in terms of real sector activities has still been slow and almost 
insignificant, for reasons already discussed above. 
 
                                                              






V.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND SOME POLICY PROPOSALS 
Our alternative perspective on the melt-down of the global economy contests the theory and 
related policy prescriptions that are based on the "efficient market" hypothesis of the 
mainstream school.  Drawing attention to the underconsumptionist tendencies of product 
markets in advanced countries, which in the developing world are tagged by export-drives, 
our arguments highlight the role of labor flexibility in these liberalized regimes which speak 
for the wage squeeze. The shortfall  in demand caused by the wage-productivity gap direct 
investments to the short-term high-profit high-risk areas of finance. The latter, while partially 
compensating for the slow growth in the real sector by the brisk churning of asset-backed 
securities and high leverages financing the derivative financial instruments, have failed to 
work when financial market in advanced economies collapsed, simultaneously and also in 
succession, by late 2008. A major reason for such collapse was the erosion of confidence in 
those financial transactions, an aspect which mainstream theory and policy never recognized. 
The alternative position we offer looks at the uncertainty-ridden trail of markets, which often 
deviates from the predictions of the private "market makers." The above position has 
considerable significance for policies that are appropriate to mend the system. This is also 
confirmed by the failure of what was tried with massive bail-outs of the financial institutions 
along with limited measures to stimulate the real sector with fiscal devices.  
  Policy moves in the advanced economies have not so far addressed the two major 
issues which are continuing to plague the global economy. These include the dominance of 
speculation-led transactions in the markets for financial assets and the relatively higher 
returns on such investments as compared to those backed by real assets. With wages trailing 
far behind the growth in labor productivity, growth in the real sector often tends to be 
demand-constrained, a situation described as one with tendencies for underconsumption. 
With slow or negative growth rates in the real economy, and profit opportunities moving up 
in the booming financial sector, investments had a natural tendency to be directed to the 
latter. As we mentioned earlier, a boom in the financial sector often created little opportunity 
for expansions in the real economy. 
  Incentives to invest can be generated in the real sector with higher growth rates 
therein. This requires an expansionary strategy of public policy with expenditure targeted to 
generate additional demand by creating employment. At the same time curbs on speculation 




pace of short-term speculation in these markets. As with an expansionary strategy to revamp 
the real sector, a move to control speculation and short-termism in the financial sector needs 
to prop on state level regulation, both at a national and an international level. 
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